PeeJay V had no fire alarm system and staff could not reach life saving equipment

Thursday, 25 January 2018

A tourist boat that caught fire forcing 60 people to abandon ship off the coast of Whakatāne had an ineffective firefighting system that staff did not know how to use. 

The findings were made in an Transport Accident Investigation Commission report released on Thursday, two years after the PeeJay V burned to the waterline and sank. 

On January 18, 2016, the boat with seven crew and 53 passengers onboard was approaching the Whakatāne Harbour after an all day-excursion to White Island when a fire broke out in the engine room. 

The blaze quickly took hold. 

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Crew on board released the fixed CO2 fire extinguisher into the engine room, which suppressed the fire for a short time. 

But the report said the fire quickly escalated, forcing the skipper to order everyone to abandon the vessel. 

'Due to the speed with which the fire gained intensity, several passengers were forced to enter the water without a life jacket,' the report said.

Several vessels in the vicinity responded to the skipper's distress call. 

Everyone aboard was eventually transferred to the assisting vessels. 

'The crew were not able to access all of the life jackets on board because of the fire. For the same reason, they were not able to launch the flotation raft that was stored on top of the vessel's flybridge.'

The PeeJay V burnt to the waterline and sank. 

One crew member suffered from smoke inhalation. No one else was seriously injured.

Due to the lack of physical evidence to work with, the commission was unable to conclusively establish the cause of the fire. 

'The commission found that the absence of a fire-detection and automatic-alarm system on the PeeJay V meant the crew had limited warning time and opportunity to respond to the fire and prepare the life-saving apparatus.'

The commission also found that the CO2 fire-suppression system, which was supposed to work by displacing the air in the engine room with CO2, was not effective in suppressing the fire. 

'This was because air was able to enter the engine room through several openings, including a cable duct that had no means of being closed.'

The commission also found that the placement of the life-saving apparel and equipment on board was appropriate. 

'The fact that it could not all be accessed highlights the difficulty operators of smaller vessels have in choosing where to locate such equipment.'

The Chief Investigator of Accidents, Captain Tim Burfoot, says the commission identified three key safety issues.

'First, maritime rules didn't require the PeeJay V to have a fire alarm. Second, the CO2 firefighting system failed because the engine room wasn't airtight. 

'And third, the boat builder and its operator didn't fully appreciate how the CO2 system worked.'

For CO2 firefighting systems to be of any use, the space needs to be airtight, he said, and all staff should be fully trained and know how the system works.

'So, Maritime New Zealand has agreed to review its rules about fire alarms and remote extinguishers in vessels of this type with enclosed engine spaces.

'MNZ has also agreed to encourage people who design, install and use CO2 fixed firefighting systems to fully document and understand how these systems work.'

Three main safety issues identified during the inquiry were:

- Maritime Rules did not require the PeeJay V to have fire detection or automatic fire alarms installed even though it could carry up to 90 passengers and operate up to 12 nautical miles from the coast

- the CO2 fixed firefighting system installed in the engine room could not be fully effective in extinguishing the fire because the space it was protecting could not be fully closed down

- the builder and operators of the vessel did not fully appreciate the principles of how the CO2 fixed firefighting system operated.

The key lessons arising from this inquiry are:

- early detection of a fire onboard a vessel is critical to a successful firefighting response and for the early preparation of life-saving apparel and equipment

- crew must be fully familiar with and trained in the use of firefighting systems on board, otherwise the systems might not be of any use in fighting a fire

- even if a fixed CO2 firefighting apparatus is fully functional, it will only be effective in fighting a fire if the design of the space it is protecting can be fully closed off