The lessons to be learned from Wellington’s Town Hall saga
Tuesday, 31 October 2023
Dave Armstrong is a playwright and satirist based in Wellington. He is a regular opinion contributor.
OPINION: Last Wednesday was probably the toughest workday of the year for our city councillors, as they voted on extra funding for the Town Hall strengthening.
Most centre-right independents voted with the mayor, Greens, and ex-Greens to continue funding it to completion. Opposing them were most but not all Labour councillors and independent Dianne Calvert. Unusually, all councillors seemed to accept that it was a tough decision and were gracious to those on the other side.
Many Wellingtonians were outraged by the vote, with some believing that the councillors only voted the way they did because they were forced to.
Without relitigating the entire issue, I would point out that the Town Hall strengthening was not an evil plot to squander money by lefty councillors and heritage nuts. When first suggested, the cost quoted was considered reasonable and there was pretty much universal agreement to strengthen and save the building. Whatever decision was taken last Wednesday would have cost the council millions. And to be fair to the present mayor, CEO and councillors, the strengthening started before most of them were on the scene.
The problems since have been two-fold: the skyrocketing of costs partly caused by what was discovered underneath the building once strengthening began and, more recently, the lack of updates to councillors and public about the project. To be fair, former council CEO Kevin Lavery did warn about the many unknowns to do with the project, and most of us studiously ignored him.
I’m not an expert on project management but I do know that in any major project you regularly meet with the workers involved, and if you’re spending money, you update the client on progress. I’m not sure this has happened as regularly as it should have with the Town Hall.
If the deputy mayor knew in March that costs were blowing out, why did some councillors not know in October? Are they just plain stupid and can’t find out the information? And where’s the documentation about this? Were some “trustworthy” councillors told but not others in the awful style of briefings that happened during the previous term? Was vital information kept from certain councillors because there was a concern it would be leaked?
Structural engineer John Cuthbert, not involved in the project, wants an independent review of the situation and suspects the project has been mismanaged.
The problem the council now faces is that projects it has green-lit must be trimmed or cut completely because the final costs of projects not finished, like the Town Hall, are more than expected. Even worse, two of the city’s major council-run venues – the State Opera House and the Michael Fowler Centre – aren’t up to the council’s own earthquake standards. I worry that the Town Hall debacle will lead to a “knock ‘em down” mentality followed by complaints that the CBD needs more venues.
But are those standards, while laudable, too high? Is the council getting Rolls-Royce quotes for strengthening when a Suzuki Swift-style quote would do the job? Should the council slightly relax the standards and extend the deadlines for themselves and others? People might say that would be like the previous government who essentially lowered the NCEA standards so pass rates were higher. And they would be dead right.
A friend who works in the engineering industry described it quite nicely. If you drive a vintage car around, it’s quite good, and not too expensive, to install seatbelts. But if you must also install airbags, reinforced panels and every other modern safety feature, you start thinking you may as well ditch the lovely old car and buy a cheap Toyota.
The risk of dying from an earthquake during a performance at the Michael Fowler Centre is three times smaller than the chance of dying in a car accident in a year. Yet as I wander around Newtown, I see cafes with stickers outside saying that the building is an earthquake risk. I have more chance of dying from choking on the basil panini I scoff inside than from being killed from falling beams or masonry in an earthquake. Then again, how would I feel about going into a large earthquake-prone concert building with a class of children if I was a teacher?
Another problem is that we can’t predict exactly what buildings will be damaged in an earthquake. For example, parts of the relatively new Statistics House collapsed during the Kaikōura earthquake, yet other older “unsafe” buildings survived intact.
And yet we can’t deny the risk of major earthquakes. It might be low for a five-year period, but over a 30- or 50-year period it creeps up. Perhaps a very public city-wide conversation on earthquake risk with geologists, engineers, architects, builders and politicians might be a good idea. But that can’t happen until the council is absolutely upfront and honest about, on one hand, the risks, and on the other, the costs. And let’s start looking at safe and cost-effective methods, rather than deluxe model strengthening for every single building.