Editorial: The real lesson of the Motu Move saga

Tuesday, 7 July 2026

EDITORIAL: The National Ticketing Solution. The name is almost as clumsy as the process that began under the Key Government and, 17 years later, is still frustrating New Zealanders. Mercifully, the public will know it by the far better name, Motu Move.

Last week, The Post hosted an important but curious debate between National and Labour over who should wear the blame for the troubled programme.

The basic facts are not in dispute. New Zealand's patchwork of regional public transport ticketing systems - most underwritten by taxpayers - are nearing the end of their respective lives. They need replacing, and replacing them with a single national system is an eminently sensible idea.

Somewhere along the way, however - around 2018 - NZTA decided New Zealand's tap-on, tap-off requirements were so unique that the country should build a bespoke system rather than buy proven technology off the shelf.

That decision appears to have been driven, at least in part, by councils' inability to agree on concession rules, providers and other features. Instead of adapting existing technology to New Zealand, the project adapted itself to New Zealand's bureaucracy.

The Labour Party’s spokesman on transport, Tangi Utikere, writing in these pages, did little to defend the programme's bipartisan $1.36 billion price tag, which includes 10 years of operation. Instead, he criticised National for lacking commitment to public transport and called for bipartisanship rather than political point-scoring.

The Minister of Transport, Chris Bishop, countered that abandoning the project now would make little sense because completing it would still cost less than extending the life of the ageing regional systems before eventually replacing them anyway. And he promised a review into the “shocker”.

That raises an interesting question: what counts as a sunk cost?

Economists use the term to describe money that has already been spent and cannot be recovered. The sunk-cost fallacy is allowing that past spending to dictate future decisions, leading people to throw good money after bad.

The point is that the money is gone regardless. The only relevant question is whether spending more represents the best decision from this point forward.

The Minister of Finance, Nicola Willis, confronted precisely that dilemma when she cancelled the iReX Interislander project. By the time Ms Willis became minister, KiwiRail had informed the Government that a project initially expected to cost $750 million had ballooned to more than $3 billion.

The evidence suggested a project that had lost control of its costs through repeated changes in scope. The ferries themselves, purchased from Hyundai Mipo Shipyard, remained only a relatively small part of an increasingly expensive programme.

Had iReX continued, New Zealand might now be looking forward to new ferries. Equally, there is every chance ministers would also have been asked for still more money. Whether cancelling it was ultimately the right decision remains open to debate, but few would argue that $3 billion plus represented good value for upgrading a ferry service.

The same question hangs over Motu Move.

As The Post revealed two weeks ago, when Mr Bishop asked officials how much it would cost to rename the Motu Move card, he was told it would cost an astonishing $28 million.

Whatever the merits of continuing from here, the programme's management over successive governments has hardly inspired confidence. Responsibility has outlasted ministers, governments and officials alike.

It is difficult not to feel for the many public servants who have worked diligently on the project, only to be working within poor decisions made by senior managers. Ministers, too, deserve some sympathy. Walking away from a failing project means admitting taxpayers' money has been lost. Pressing on, even reluctantly, at least offers the hope - or rhetorical cover - that something tangible will eventually emerge.

That is why governments so often persevere.

Hopefully Motu Move is finally delivered successfully, although, as Bishop himself has acknowledged, he cannot say that with complete confidence.

Whatever the outcome, the saga offers two enduring lessons. Large public projects require far tighter discipline before costs spiral beyond control. And when reliable technology already exists, New Zealand should think very carefully before deciding it needs to invent its own.