Editorial: Place for NZ in new Australia-Fiji Alliance

Thursday, 9 July 2026

EDITORIAL: On a Friday evening in February last year, a flotilla of Chinese warships unexpectedly appeared in the Tasman Sea, conducting live-fire exercises. It caught both New Zealand and Australia by surprise. Flights were rerouted and it was widely assumed a Chinese nuclear submarine was operating nearby. Then, on Monday, came news that China had tested a nuclear-capable missile in the South Pacific.

The launch was condemned by New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Winston Peters, and his Australian counterpart, Penny Wong. China fired the apparently nuclear-capable, but unarmed, missile from a submarine into the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, which encompasses much of what was once known as the Pacific Proving Ground, where the United States conducted extensive nuclear testing after the Second World War.

The timing was notable. It came as Australia and Fiji signed a new security pact, the Ocean Peace Alliance, a development Beijing is understood to view unfavourably. China's Foreign Ministry insisted the two events were unrelated. That would be a remarkable coincidence and would suggest that China’s foreign spy agency, the Ministry of State Security, is not as effective at providing intelligence to the country’s leadership as would be expected of a great power.

Mr Peters has indicated the initial protests from the region will not be the last. “We will be talking with our Pacific partners about this development. Pacific leaders have been clear we do not want to see the region become a theatre for outside military competition,” he said.

New Zealand's instinct is often to downplay such demonstrations of military power, an inclination encouraged by Beijing's refrain not to “read too much into it”. But this is a significant development. It is another step in China's long-term effort to challenge the United States’ strategic position, and those of its allies and partners, in the South Pacific. We no longer live in the “benign security environment” of the early 2000s, as described by the then-Prime Minister, Helen Clark. If that assessment was ever accurate, it certainly is not today. The relatively peaceful post-Cold War era has ended.

The US remains the world’s pre-eminent power, but its America First posture has made it less predictable and more transactional. That may change after President Donald Trump leaves office, but there is no guarantee America will return to the strategic certainty its allies once relied upon.

There is no need to be moralistic about China's actions. History teaches that great powers seek regional hegemony before trying for global dominance if possible. The South Pacific may seem remote, but the same strategic logic applies here as anywhere else. Despite China’s frequent anti-US imperialist rhetoric, it is itself an aspiring empire. And as such, it does not really have allies, instead dividing the world into a list of potential vassals and adversaries.

Over the past two decades Beijing has expanded its influence through diplomacy, infrastructure investment and increasingly visible military activity. It has made extensive use of debt-financed infrastructure through its Belt and Road Initiative, leaving some developing nations heavily indebted while also creating a way to export its economic excess capacity created by its state-directed investment-heavy economy.

Neither New Zealand nor Australia — often viewed in parts of the Pacific as the more extractive partner — has invested consistently enough in relationships with our neighbours to ensure Chinese offers of assistance held little attraction. That is why Australia is strengthening formal security partnerships across the Pacific. The Post believes New Zealand should seriously consider joining arrangements that place greater responsibility for regional security in the hands of Pacific nations themselves. Our long-standing objective should remain to trade with and cooperate with all major powers while avoiding unnecessary choices between them. But that policy must rest on a realistic assessment of the strategic environment, not nostalgia for one that no longer exists.

Those questions will sit high on the agenda or on sideline conversations, at next month's Pacific Islands Forum. New Zealand's preferred outcome should be a South Pacific free of great-power rivalry. But hoping for that outcome is not enough. Preparing for a future in which strategic competition becomes a permanent feature of our region is both realistic and prudent.